It is natural to think that a household may learn from its own negative experiences and subsequently increase savings. The implications of such informal learning for the aggregate economy may be quite important, for example, after a sharp increase in unemployment following an economic crisis. This paper tests the hypothesis that Japanese households learn from their experiences of large expenditure and increase their targets for precautionary savings after such experiences. The results imply that households raise their targets for precautionary savings by 57 percent of annual income in response to such experiences. Moreover, data are consistent with the argument that targets for savings aect actual savings. Assuming this holds, the results in this paper suggest that consumers may increase their actual savings following a negative nancial experience.
Introduction
Despite growing literature on learning in the eld of macroeconomic policy, 1 economists have not paid much attention to the eect of learning on decision making between consumption and saving.
2 While Several recent works have started to examine the eectiveness of formal learning in such decision making (e.g., attending retirement seminars), 3 work on informal learning remains particularly limited, with a few exceptions (e.g., Lusardi (2003) ; Allen and Carroll (2001) ). Economists have a good reason for assuming away learning in a saving model: if we seriously take learning into account (in particular, in a heterogeneous agents model), we need to know the distribution of information to obtain aggregate implications, which may substantially complicate the model.
It is, however, natural to think that a household may learn from its own negative experiences and subsequently increase savings. The implications of such informal learning for the aggregate economy may be quite important, for example, after a sharp increase in unemployment following an economic crisis. One could test for this type of learning by regressing (the change in) the wealth to permanent income ratio on the dummy of an own negative experience (e.g., large expenditure, income shock). However, this test is subject to a serious identication problem because those who have experienced a negative experience typically reduce savings. 4 This paper steps back and considers an alternative hypothesis: a household's negative experience may aect its target for precautionary savings. I test this hypothesis using the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC), which records targets for precautionary savings. Of course, testing this hypothesis is not the same as testing whether own negative experience aects savings behavior (updating the target for savings does not necessarily mean a change in behavior), but this is a step forward in understanding household saving and consumption decision making.
The results in this paper support the hypothesis that households' perceptions change after experiencing an adverse nancial experience, with estimated coecients suggesting that in Japan households raise their targets for precautionary savings by 57 percent of (permanent) income after large expenditure. Moreover, the data are consistent with the argument that the targets for savings aect actual savings. Assuming this holds, the results imply that households save more (than others) following large expenditure.
This paper is closely related to that of Owen and Wu (2007) . Using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 5 they show that households experiencing negative nancial shocks worry more about the adequacy of their retirement savings; however, the present paper focuses on precautionary savings.
I complement Owen and Wu (2007) 's work by quantifying the impact of a negative nancial shock, whereas they examine the qualitative impact of such a shock.
The next section presents the econometric model, and Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 reports the results, followed by conclusions.
Econometric Model
The econometric model used in this paper is based on the buer stock model (Carroll (1997) ). The buer stock model implies that in period t, household i has a target level m * i,t for its (precautionary) savings to permanent noncapital income ratio:
, where M * i,t is the target for precautionary savings (level) and P i,t is permanent noncapital income. This implies:
where (1) is controlled for by demographic variables, we consider the following econometric model:
• The key variable is D i,t , which is the dummy for whether the household has experienced a negative nancial shock in the past year. The coecient on D i,t
should be positive if a household learns from its experience and subsequently increases its target for precautionary savings.
There are at least two potential mechanisms through which a household could increase its target for precautionary savings following an unfavorable nancial event. First, its risk aversion could rise (simulations in Carroll (1997) conrm that the target wealth income ratio is higher with higher risk aversion). Second, it may revise its perceived probability of negative events upward. The second mechanism is consistent with the empirical ndings of Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992) , Lusardi (1997) , and Lusardi (1998) that subjective earnings risks have a positive eect on wealth accumulation.
Using an own experience variable may involve the omitted variable problem. This is because own experience is likely to be highly correlated with unobservable individually specic factors such as ability and preferences. For example, those who are less able might be more likely to be hit by an accident that leads to a large expenditure or an income loss. The problem is that such unobservable factors may not be fully captured by control variables, possibly creating a correlation between the error term and the key dummy (D i,t in this paper). Using the xed eects estimator (FE) could alleviate this problem.
• Z i,t is a set of demographic variables and time dummies. Demographic variables consist of the age of the household head (husband); 7 age squared; the number of family members; education dummies; industry dummies; and occupation dummies interacted with the dummy for whether or not the head has regular employment.
Since P i,t is not observable in reality, this paper estimates the equation by replacing P i,t in (2) with actual household total income Y i,t . I estimate the model mainly using the instrumental variable (IV) method, using log Y i,t−1 as the instrument for log Y i,t (throughout the IV regressions in this paper, I am using a one-year lag of log Y i,t (or Y i,t ) as the instrument). 8 The panel structure of the data (discussed below) allows the use of the FE as well. Under the assumption that individually specic unobservable elements such as preferences are time-invariant, 9 the FE corrects the omitted variable problem.
Data
The data used in the econometric analysis are taken from the JPSC. In particular, the JPSC asks two questions that are critical for this paper. The rst is:
How much are your household's target savings for unexpected expenses such as illness, disaster, and so on? I interpret this as the target for precautionary savings and use it as M * i,t below. 10 The second is: Which of the following has your household experienced:
i) large expenditure; and/or ii) income and/or wealth decline? 11 I use the answer to the second question to construct D i,t .
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Questions similar to these two questions are 7 I assume that the husband is the head because in more than 90 percent of the households in the data set, the husband's income is higher than that of the wife.
8 Equation (2) tells us that the dependent variable should be M * i,t /P i,t , but Y i,t , which includes a transitory component, is used as an estimate for P i,t . This can be seen as a measurement error problem, and the error term ε i,t picks up the transitory component in Y i,t . The correlation between the error term and log Y i,t (an estimate for log P i,t ) requires instrumenting log Y i,t .
9 Examples of such unobservable elements include preferences, but Z i,t is unlikely to fully control for them.
10 The intention of this question is to obtain the target for precautionary savings. However, the possibility that misreporting occurs cannot be denied. For example, some households might include expected expenses for illness. If so, the responses also cover life-cycle savings because, in a pure sense, precautionary savings should cover only savings for unexpected events. 11 The full list includes several other experiences (e.g., the wife's depression), but they are omitted here because they are not relevant to this paper's hypothesis. 12 The JPSC introduced this question in 1994 (it is not in the initial 1993 survey).
also asked in the SCF, 13 which could allow researchers to conduct a similar test using the SCF. However, the advantage in the JPSC is that it is a panel data and thus we can test dynamics in saving behavior, while the SCF is not.
In my data set, I have included only married households; restricted the head's (husband)'s age to between 20 and 60 to avoid the impact of retirement; and measured nancial variables in 1993 prices (using headline CPI). In addition, in each of the regressions below, the top and bottom 1 percent of the dependent variable are trimmed (as the distribution is very wide). Summary statistics of key variables (used for the IV regressions reported in Table 1 ) are reported in Appendix A.
Results
Do households raise targets for precautionary savings after adverse events? The results by estimating equation (2) provide support for the hypothesis that households increase their targets for savings following a negative nancial event. When setting D i,t at 1 if household i has experienced large expenditure over the past year, the coecient estimated by IV is positive and signicant (rst column of Table 1 ). The results are robust with the choice of the instrument. 14 The estimates using the FE (second column)
are very similar to those of IV, providing no evidence against using IV despite the possible omitted variable problem (discussed above). The size of the coecient on D i,t is about 5 percent, meaning that if a household experiences large expenditure, its target for precautionary savings rises by 5 percent of annual permanent (household) income.
The third and fourth columns show that including the target for savings for comfort in M * i,t gives similar coecients on D i,t but these are no longer signicant (possibly reecting the smaller sample size 15 ).
When setting the key dummy at 1 if the household has reduced income and/or wealth, the coecient is insignicant although still positive (fth and sixth columns). This could be because following a negative income shock, some households may learn that their future permanent income has declined and cut their targets for precautionary savings accordingly. From this point, this paper focuses on an experience of large expenditure.
Is the perception change (change in M * i,t ) persistent?
The results provide some support for this, although they are mixed. Take ∆ T M * i,t /P i,t = (M * i,t − M * i,t−T )/P i,t as the dependent variable and D i,t−(T −1) (this is 1 if the household experienced large expenditure between T − 1 and T years ago) as the main independent variable. If the eect of learning from high expenditure is persistent, the coecient on D i,t−(T −1) should be positive because M * i,t should remain high in response to the negative event between
T − 1 and T years ago (D i,t−(T −1) = 1). When T = 5, the IV coecient is signicant 13 Specically, since 1995 it has been asking About how much do you think you (and your family) need to have in savings for emergencies and other unexpected things that may come up?. It also asks Did you take out this mortgage to: renance or rollover an earlier loan, borrow additional money on your home equity, or to do both? and subsequently
For what purpose was the money used? (these two questions could be used to identify events of expenditure). 14 As noted above, the regression in the rst column used a one-year lag of actual household income as the instrument.
Using a two-year lag gives very similar results (not reported here). 15 More observations are missing for the target for savings for comfort than for precautionary savings. The results change little from the baseline (in Table 1 ) with an alternative estimate for permanent income. For example, the rst two columns of Table 3 indicate that when using P i,t estimated using a three-year average (t − 1, t, t + 1),
16 the results are almost identical to those reported in Table 1 . A ve-year average (columns three and four) yields very similar results.
The results are also robust using an alternative level specication:
where Y i,t (actual income) is used as an estimate of P i,t . Using Y i,t−1 as the instrument of Y i,t , the coecient on D i,t is about 40 thousand yen and highly signicant (the last two columns of Table 3 ). This is about 67 percent of average annual household income slightly higher than the magnitude estimated above (Table 1 and the rst four columns of Table 3 ).
So far, this paper has not paid attention to events underlying large expenditure, but the JPSC allows us to examine their relevance. Before asking about the experience of such expenditure, the JPSC asks whether any of the family members (other than 16 The idea of estimating P i,t using a multiyear average follows Carroll and Samwick (1998) . 17 This level specication may be misspecied. The level specication restricts the coecient on P i,t to be constant across households, but equation (1) implies that if the coecient on P i,t is proportional to m * i,t , it is heterogeneous across consumers. the wife) has experienced adverse events, including: i) serious illness; ii) an accident or disaster; and iii) consumer trouble. The responses to this question can be used to examine the relevance of these events, which are highly correlated with the dummy of large expenditure (rst column of Table 4 ).
Do any of these events have an impact on the target for precautionary savings? The results are weak. If the dummy of serious illness (of family members other than the wife) is used as the main variable, the coecient is positive but insignicant (second column of Table 4 ). This may be because in many cases expenses from a (long) illness are not large enough to inuence the targets for precautionary savings (no more than 60 percent of long illnesses are accompanied by large expenditure). However, even if the dummy of serious illness is interacted with the dummy of large expenditure, the coecient remains insignicant (although becoming higher), which could be because the number of observations with the interaction term = 1 is not large enough (at most 100 The data show that actual liquid assets (M i,t ) and the target for precautionary savings (M * i,t ) are highly correlated (rst four columns of Table 5 ). Of course, the regression results in the table are likely to be subject to the endogeneity problem as households with higher liquid assets may raise their targets for precautionary savings. Using a lagged variable as the main independent variable 19 may correct the endogeneity problem (the last two columns of the table), but might still be subject to an omitted variable problem.
For example, if a household knew in year t − 1 that it would receive a positive income shock in year t, this would raise both M i,t and M * i,t−1 , creating a positive coecient on M * i,t−1 even when there is no causality from M *
There is an alternative (and more theory-based) way to examine the relation between actual savings and the target for savings. The buer stock model implies that the ratio of actual precautionary savings to permanent income converges to the target ratio in expectation (Carroll (2004) ). By assuming that the rate of convergence in expectation
) is proportional to the deviation from the target ratio a year
where α 1 > 0 is a parameter that determines the rate of convergence. Below, M i,t is liquid assets as a proxy for precautionary savings.
The results support the prediction of the buer stock model. Estimating equation (4) (with the same control variables as before) gives a highly signicant α 1 (rst column of Table 6 ). The estimate is about 0.08, meaning that, on average, households close 8 percent of the deviation from the target in each year. Assessing whether or not this magnitude is reasonable is dicult, but it is within the (wide) range of estimates implied by the buer stock model (see simulation results in Appendix B).
While equation (4) assumes that the rate of convergence is linearly proportional to the deviation from the target, it might be that the relation between convergence rate and deviation from the target is nonlinear. The second column of the table reports the results, allowing the nonlinearity by including the quadratic term of the deviation.
Specically, the following model is estimated:
The results support nonlinearity (second column), but, with a reasonable deviation from the target, the impact of nonlinearity is quantitatively negligible because the estimated coecient on the quadratic term is so small. This implies that the linearity assumption is broadly valid. Note also that the estimate of α 1 changes very little from that reported in the rst column. The estimation results of the level specication 18 As discussed in the introduction, investigating the correlation between actual savings and an expenditure shock does not work. 19 An alternative approach is to use a lagged variable as the instrument. Table 5 Regressions of Convergence Process Note: In the rst two columns, the main independent variable was instrumented by its own numerator. This is because the denominator (Y t as an estimate of P t ) in the main independent variable contains the same transitory component as the dependent variable does, which, without an appropriate instrument, might bias the coecient on the main independent variable. Table 6 Regressions of Change in Actual Savings Note: In the rst two columns, each main independent variable was instrumented by its own numerator. This is because the denominator (Y t−1 as an estimate for P t−1 ) in the main independent variable contains the same transitory component as the dependent variable does.
(∆M i,t = α 1 (M * i,t−1 − M i,t−1 )) are similar (third and fourth columns). 20 However, all these estimates remain subject to the omitted variable problem.
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The results in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the argument that the targets for precautionary savings aect actual savings over time. Assuming this, the earlier results in this paper imply that an experience of large expenditure may increase actual savings through a higher target for precautionary savings.
Is convergence faster for those who experienced an adverse event? The results are not conclusive. It may be natural to think that those who suered large expenditure start taking wealth accumulation more seriously, and thus attempt to close the gap between the target for savings and actual savings more quickly than the rest of the population. To test this idea, I included the deviation interacted with the dummy of large expenditure experienced between one and two years ago in addition to the deviation term. (As before, M i,t is liquid assets as a proxy for precautionary savings.) Signs of the coecients are consistent with the argument above, but the results are not very strong.
20 Note that the level specication may be misspecied because equation (4) does not produce the level specication here. 21 See the discussion above about the results of the last two columns of Table 5 Table 7 Testing the Rate of Convergence
IV IV Note: In the rst column, the two main independent variables were instrumented by their own numerators. This is because the denominator (Y t−1 as an estimate for P t−1 ) in the main independent variable contains the same transitory component as the dependent variable does.
In both of the ratio and level specications, the coecient is positive but insignicant (Table 7) .
Retirement savings This paper has focused on precautionary savings, but in principle, a household's own experiences could have an impact on other types of savings. In particular, they may aect retirement savings. The implications of learning for retirement savings in the aggregate economy could be more important than those for precautionary savings, given the aggregate size of retirement savings.
In this context, using the JPSC, I tested another hypothesisthat households that have taken care of elderly parents over the past year may increase their targets for their retirement savings to (permanent) income ratios. 22 The idea behind this hypothesis is that if households learn through parental care that the last stage in life is expensive, they may revise upward their targets for retirement savings.
The results fail to support the hypothesis (rst column of Table 8 ), but the weak results may be simply because households reported in the JPSC are generally too young to respond to their experience of parental care. 23 To examine this possibility, we could restrict the sample to households whose head is over a certain age, for example, age 45, 22 The JPSC also reports targets for retirement savings.
23 Theory implies that households start seriously accumulating wealth at a late stage in life Carroll (1997) . Note: ∆M * t refers to the target for retirement savings, while D t is 1 if a household has taken care of an elderly parent over the past year.
but that reduces the sample size to less than one-fth of the full sample and does not help to produce stronger results (second column).
24 Perhaps, to test the signicance of learning on retirement savings in Japan, future research should examine micro data that contain more older households than covered by the JPSC.
5 Conclusions
This paper tested the hypothesis that households in Japan learn from their adverse nancial experiences and thus increase their targets for precautionary savings. The data suggest that households raise their targets for precautionary savings by 57 percent of annual income in response to large expenditure events. Therefore, the aggregate impact of learning from (own) large events could be potentially substantial because about 10 percent of households experience such a shock each year (assuming that the targets for precautionary savings aect actual savings over time).
An area of future (and related) research is the impact of learning on retirement savings, which could be more important than precautionary savings from an aggregate perspective. This paper has failed to nd evidence for learning associated with retirement savings, but that may be because of the undersampling of seniors in the JPSC. 24 The results do not change much with an alternative age threshold.
25 For the United States, the HRS is an ideal data set for such an analysis.
A Summary Statistics the fact that more women in the sample are married (recall that the JPSC tracks only women as respondents and that this paper restricted the sample to married households). 
Consider the buer stock model where households (in the simulation) solve the following innite horizon maximization problem:
where u(•) = • 1−ρ /(1−ρ) is a constant relative risk aversion utility function. Households determine their consumption level C t given cash on hand M t and permanent noncapital income (level) P t (the two state variables). The budget constraint is:
where A t is the assets at the end of period t; M t+1 is the sum of the interest R times end-of-period assets and next-period noncapital income (equal to permanent noncapital income P t+1 multiplied by a mean-one iid transitory income shock factor θ t+1 ); and P t+1 is equal to its previous value, multiplied by a growth factor G and a mean-one iid shock ψ t+1 . The simulation runs 9,000 households for 500 periods, and the convergence equation (above) is estimated using the last 2 periods of (simulated) cross-section data.
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The baseline parameter values for the simulation are gathered in Table 10 . 
0.1
The estimates for the coecient on (M * i,t−1 −M i,t−1 )/P i,t−1 cover a wide range, varying with parameter values. The rst column of Table 11 indicates that with the baseline parameter values (Table 10) , the estimated coecient is 0.21. Although changing impatience (lower or higher discount factor β) does not aect the sign of the coecient, it changes the size of the coecient signicantly (second and third columns). Changing G or R gives similar results (not reported here). 28 The results are also sensitive to the variance of income shocks (fourth and fth columns).
The simulation supports nonlinearity in the convergence process. If the quadratic term ((M * i,t−1 − M i,t−1 )/P i,t−1 ) 2 is included in the equation, its coecient is highly signicant (Table 12) . Moreover, the coecient size of the quadratic term is in some cases quite large (close to 1), suggesting that the impact of nonlinearity could be quantitatively meaningful (unlike the implication of the empirical result in Table 6 ). 
